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Abstract—Hackers target their attacks on the most vulnerable
parts of a system. A system is therefore only as strong as its
weakest part, similar to the Cannikin Law, which states that
the capacity of a barrel of water depends on the height of the
shortest rather than the longest piece of wood.
To ensure the security of 5G networks, we first need to
understand the overall 5G architecture and examine the potential
threats instead of merely setting up a firewall. However, 5G
networks will have tremendous coverage. The development of 5G
techniques require extensive resources, leading to intense com-
petition between countries attempting to develop 5G networks.
Many outstanding papers discuss the techniques for developing
specific aspects of the 5G architecture, but to the best of our
knowledge, few provide an overview of a complete 5G network.
This presents us with a difficult situation because we need to
consider the overall architecture to ensure the security of 5G
networks. To address that problem, in this paper we provide
essential guidelines for understanding the architecture of 5G.
We introduce 5G scenarios, outline the network architecture,
and highlight the potential security issues for the various com-
ponents of a 5G network. This paper is intended to facilitate
a preliminary understanding of the 5G architecture and the
possible security concerns of the various components.
The end to end (E2E) 5G network architecture is composed of
a next-generation radio access network (NG-RAN), multi-access
edge computing (MEC), virtual evolved packet core (vEPC),
a data network (DN) and a cloud service. Network slicing
(NS), network function virtualization (NFV), NFV Management
and Orchestration (MANO) and software-defined networking
(SDN) are also important techniques for achieving 5G network
architectures.
Index Terms—Security; NG-RAN; MEC; vEPC; SDN; NFV;
NFV MANO; Network Slicing
I. INTRODUCTION
5G aims to use the same network infrastructure to provide
customized services for each vertical industry. 3GPP summa-
rizes these vertical industries and classifies 5G scenarios into
three categories:
• Enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) focuses on high
data rate and high data traffic.
• Ultra-reliable and low latency communications (URLLC)
focuses on low latency, low error rate, and ultra-
reliability.
• Massive Machine Type Communications (mMTC) fo-
cuses on massive numbers of connections and saving
energy.
We introduce the technologies required to accomplish these
demands under the same infrastructure.
• Network Slicing (NS): NS is a macroscopic concept that
virtually separates the infrastructure into many parallel
slices. The slices are isolated from each other to pre-
vent congestion and to prevent faults in one slice from
affecting the others. The concept helps 5G to provide a
guaranteed service because current network services can
only provide a ”best effort,” with no guarantee.
• Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN) 5G
radio can utilize the spectrum from 400 MHz to 100
GHz, and this is divided into remote radio heads (RRHs)
and virtualized baseband units (BBUs). The base station
is separated into two parts because 5G uses a higher
spectrum than 4G; a higher spectrum means higher signal
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attenuation, so separating the base station into two parts
allows better control.
• Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC): To reduce the
latency, some network functions are moved from the
vEPC to the MEC. MEC can be considered a light vEPC.
• virtual Evolved Packet Core (vEPC): The vEPC virtual-
izes the LTE EPC, divides the original network functions
into several parts and adds new functions.
• Software-Defined Networking (SDN): SDN is used to
assist in the isolation and flexibility of NS.
• Network Function Virtualization (NFV): A virtualized
network function such as the vEPC’s network function
or a virtual firewall.
• NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO): A virtu-
alization platform that manages many NFVs.
Fig. 1: 5G E2E Network Architecture: the components of 5G
are NG-RAN, MEC and vEPC.
The 5G E2E network architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1,
which provides an overview of 5G E2E networks. Fig. 1,
Fig . 2, and Fig. 3 all show the same picture but emphasize
different aspects. The transition from 3G to 4G focused on the
base station because wireless communication from the base
station was the bottleneck. When progressing from 4G to 5G,
however, the E2E architecture is more important because the
base station is not the main bottleneck in the 5G network.
The 5G technologies mentioned above are described in detail
in the next section.
II. 5G ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK
A. Network Slicing Architecture
Network slicing provides a variety of independent service
level agreements (SLA) for different needs. The services do
not interfere with each other.
A network slice can be divided into two subsets: one for
the RAN network slice subnet instance (NSSI) and the other
for the CN NSSI. A slice can serve several different services
at the same time, and the network slicing and services are
independent. The network slicing may not disappear at the
end of the service, so it is very flexible. A schematic diagram
of NS is shown in Fig. 2. The NS properties have previously
been addressed in the 3GPP specification [3] [4] [5]. The 3GPP
specification is introduced below.
Fig. 2: 5G Network Slicing Architecture, showing that an
NSSI may provide several services at the same time but these
services are isolated from each other.
1) The NS lifecycle consists of four steps:
• Preparation phase.
• Instantiation, Configuration and Activation phase.
• Run-time phase.
• Decommissioning phase.
2) Types of Network Slicing:
• Shared constituent network slice instance (NSI): Many
NSIs share one NSSI.
• Shared constituent NSSI: Many NSSIs share one network
function(NF).
• Non-shared NSSI: An NSSI is used for only one NSI.
3) Network Slicing Behavior:
• An NSI may be created for one or more communication
service.
• The NSI and the communication service are independent;
the NSI might not stop when a communication service is
over because another communication service might start.
B. Next-Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN)
LTE base stations (BSs) are independent of each other. The
disadvantage of this is that the wireless spectrum resources
are seriously wasted. The mobile device will interfere with
the surrounding BS interval.
To overcome these problems in the LTE, the cloud radio
access network has been defined and chosen as the next
generation RAN (NG-RAN) [6] [7]. The NG-RAN system
consists of RRHs and a pool of BBUs, and two connected
front-haul networks. The RRHs collect wireless signals from
mobile devices and is transmitted to the BBU pool with front-
haul assistance. The virtualized and centrally controlled BBU
pool can manage multiple base stations simultaneously and
can dynamically allocate spectrum, time and spatial to meet
dynamic traffic demands. The location of the NG-RAN in the
5G network is shown in Fig. 3.
C. Virtual Evolved Packet Core (vEPC) Network Functions
LTE EPC functions are also virtualized into multiple virtual
network functions (VNFs). Virtualization offers the ability to
quickly deploy service environments and reduce construction
costs. Several vEPC components are discussed below and
shown in Fig.3. These components are compared with the
functions of LTE EPCs.
Fig. 3: 5G vEPC architecture, focusing on the VNFs of a
vEPC.
1) Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF):
The AMF has some of the functions of the 4G EPC MME;
it manages registration, connection, mobility, context, access
authentication, and authorization.
2) Session Management function (SMF): The SMF has
some of the functions of the 4G EPC MME/PGW function; it
manages the session, IP address allocation (static or DHCP),
traffic steering, and policy enforcement.
3) User Plane Function (UPF): The UPF has some of func-
tions of the 4G EPC SGW/PGW; it manages packet routing
and packet forwarding. The UPF also plays an important role
in connecting to the DN and RAN.
4) Policy Control Function (PCF): The PCF has some of
the functions of the 4G EPC PCRF; it provides the policy rules
to control the plane and unifies the policy framework.
5) Authentication Server Function (AUSF): The AUSF has
some of the function of the 4G HSS; it acts as the authenti-
cation server.
6) Unified Data Management (UDM): UDM has some of
the 4G EPC HSS function; it manages the user identification,
subscriber data and authentication credentials.
7) Network Exposure function (NEF): The NEF is new and
does not appear in the 4G EPC. It provides an exposure in-
terface to exchange information between internal and external
networks.
8) Application Function (AF): The AF has the same ability
as the 4G AF function; it accesses the NEF and interacts with
the PCF.
9) Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF): NSSF is a
new function that does not appear in the 4G EPC. It selects
the proper network slice instances and AMF for the user.
D. Software Defined Network (SDN)
The inclusion of NFV MANO systems in 5G networks
will inevitably increase the burden on the infrastructure. It
is difficult to configure the device settings for such dynamic
systems. The target of SDN is to use programmable software-
driven devices to control the behavior of the infrastructure
[8]. With SDN, user services can be delivered faster and the
efficiency of network resources increases. SDN is based on
three principles:
• decoupling of control from traffic forwarding and pro-
cessing,
• logically centralized control, and
• programmability of network services.
III. 5G MANAGEMENT PLATFORM
Both NG-RAN and vEPC have been virtualized into
many NFVs. The NFV system is larger and more flexible
than the previous business model for telecom operators.
The implementation of an NFV system involves combining
the VNF into a network function chain, which evaluates
how to forward packet flows from this VNF to another. An
efficient management solution is needed for the complicated
architecture of 5G networks. The aim of NFV MANO systems
is to process network resources, handle running services,
decrease deployment costs and reduce the complexity of
implementing new services.
A. NFV MANO (Management and Orchestration)
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) published the NFV system architecture framework [9],
known as NFV management and orchestration (MANO) and
shown in Fig.4.
Fig. 4: ETSI NFV Architectural Framework
Many open source organizations have developed their own
NFV MANO frameworks, although they are basically based
on the ETSI framework. The modules and functions are as
follows.
1) NFV Infrastructure(NFVI): Infrastructure for NFV tech-
nology that provides virtualized computing, storage, and net-
working.
2) Virtual Network Function (VNF): The virtual network
functions running on the NFVI, such as the firewall, NAT,
and CDN.
3) Operations Support System/Business Support System
(OSS/BSS): Responsible for telecommunications services such
as billing and user data maintenance.
4) Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM): Responsible for
managing NFVI and allocating virtual resources. OpenStack
is often used to implement the VIM.
5) VNF Manager(VNFM): Responsible for managing the
VNF, its tasks include starting and stopping the VNF, status
monitoring, and configuration settings.
6) Network Function Virtualization Orchestrator (NFVO):
Responsible for coordinating the VNFM and VIM according
to the requirements of the OSS/BSS to orchestrate a specific
service such as a firewall or to detect intrusions. We introduced
the architecture of the ETSI NFV system framework above and
the combination of the VIM, VNFM, NFVO is referred to as
NFV MANO.
B. NFV MANO Implementations
Many open-source and commercial projects reference the
ETSI framework model. We provide a brief introduction to
these projects.
1) OSM: Open-source MANO (OSM) is an ETSI project
[18]. OSM consists of three main software components, which
can be mapped onto the ETSI MANO framework: 1. Virtual
Infrastructure Management (VIM), 2. VNF Management, and
3. the NFV Orchestration (NFVO) layer.
2) SONATA: The SONATA [11] service platform is im-
plemented in a modular micro-service, which is very flexible
and helps the operator to modify a customized function. [12]
integrates the network controller and the virtual machine,
which are already implemented in SONATA.
3) Open NFV (OPNFV): Launched by the Linux Founda-
tion in September 2014 [13], OPNFV focuses on NFVI and
includes an SDN controller and switch. OPNFV is a platform
for implementing NFV and can feedback the necessary infor-
mation to the ONAP platform. The four goals of OPNFV are
as follows.
• After testing, use continuous integration/continuous de-
livery (CI/CD) to develop an open source platform that
can build NFV system functions.
• Invite telecommunication service operators to join the
program and verify that OPNFV meets user expectations.
• Join other open source projects that will use OPNFV to
ensure consistency, performance, and interoperability.
• Build an ecosystem of NFV solutions based on open
source.
4) ONAP: Formed in March 2017 [14], the ONAP platform
provides a real-time, policy-driven orchestration platform. It
allows developers to automate new services and manage their
lifecycles. The ONAP platform components are shown in
Fig.5. There are three major requirements.
• A robust design framework models the resources and
relationships, guides the service behavior using policy
rules, and flexibly manages the applications and closed-
loop events.
• An orchestration and control framework (Service
Orchestrator and Controllers) instantiates the service
automatically and manages service demands.
• An analytic framework, based on the specified design,
analyzes, monitors, and elastically adjusts the service
behavior during the service lifecycle.
Fig. 5: ONAP Platform Components
Controllers, Data Collection, Analytics and Events (DCAE)
is a component that can help to extend the ONAP to provide
functionalities related to security. The DACE component is
introduced below.
• DCAE uses many analytic micro-services to collect
usage, performance, and configuration data about the
managed environment and thus has the ability to detect
anomalous conditions and trigger appropriate actions.
We could register to DCAE to collect the information we
needed to develop a security solution as a VNF to enhance
the ability of the ONAP platform. We proposed an end-to-end
trainable Tree-Shaped Deep Neural Network (TSDNN) model
and a Quantity Dependent Backpropagation (QDBP) algorithm
at the IEEE PIMRC in 2017 [15] to analyze malicious flows
and expected it to become one of the potential security
solutions.
IV. 5G POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS
We can clearly identify where the potential threats to 5G
lie based on the knowledge mentioned above. The following
potential threats to the 5G network are as follows.
A. Potential Security Threats in Network Slicing
3GPP TR 33.811 [16] is a new topic that was created in
November 2017 for security issues. Four key security issues
with NS and attack tactics have been identified.
1) Unauthorized Access to Management Exposure Inter-
face: Due to the flexibility of the network slice, we can see
from Fig.2 that there must be an interface between the NG-
RAN and vEPC or vEPC and the application service in the
cloud. If the interface is subject to unauthorized accessed,
the network slice isolation may be invalid and the following
attacks may occur.
• Services may be changed in unauthorized ways.
• A fake NSI may be created to track customers.
• NS services may be deleted or modified to achieve a DoS
attack.
• The routing mechanism may be changed to achieve a
man-in-the-middle attack.
2) Protecting the Results of NSI Supervision/Reporting:
As with VMware or KVM, a host is needed to integrate the
various virtualized parts, and NSI supervision/reporting is also
necessary. This secret information must be well protected.
• Information might be disclosed to the attacker when the
information is not encrypted.
• The NS service may be modified by tampering with NSI
supervision/reporting.
3) Protecting Network Slice Subnet Template(NSST): Many
templates are pre-set in the design of the network slicing to
enable rapid response to user demand. The template must be
protected to prevent it from being probed.
• Attack NSI by collecting information when the informa-
tion is not encrypted.
• Tamper with the NSST to fail the NS.
4) Insecure Procedure for Capability Negotiation: Take the
OpenSSL downgrade attack as an example. If a man-in-the-
middle attack has been successfully performed, the hacker
can deliberately inform that it only supports the encryption
protocol of the older version that has been cracked. The com-
munication packets are then encrypted by a weaker protocol
so the hacker can easily decrypt the encrypted packet and steal
the information.
• Downgrade the NS capabilities by man-in-the-middle
attack.
B. Security Threats to NG-RAN
1) DoS Attack: Malicious base stations interfere with other
base stations by sending out useless network traffic signals.
This kind of attack can only block the service but cannot steal
the data.
2) Primary User Simulation Attack: There are primary
users and secondary users in the NG-RAN, and the network
environment is more complicated than the traditional core
network. For example, a malicious attacker can occupy a
specific idle spectrum band by simulating the characteristics of
the primary user. When the secondary user wants to implement
the spectrum resource, the malicious attacker can respond to
the request that there is no idle resource to reject the secondary
user.
3) Virtual BBU pool security: Just as the SDN controller
controls many SDN switches, the virtual BBU pool manages
multiple base stations simultaneously. This also makes it a
target for hackers. The virtual BBU pool has a VNF platform.
If the hacker enters through the platform interface, several base
stations can be affected at the same time. Compared with 4G
base stations, which are closed and independent, the security
of virtualized BBUs pool is a new topic.
C. Security Threats to the vEPC
1) Security of the Network Exposure function (NEF):
Because dynamic and flexible deployment of 5G is necessary,
there must be an interface for exchanging messages. The NEF
is a new vEPC function that provides an exposure interface to
exchange information between internal and external networks.
Ensuring the security of the NEF is a new topic. If an
exchanged message is spoofed or tampered with, it will cause
great harm to the whole vEPC.
2) N4 interface security: The N4 interface connects the
UPF and AMF. This interface is closed in a 4G EPC, but not
in 5G vEPC, where an encryption mechanism is needed to
protect it. Security between the UPF and AMF is an open
issue that still needs to be solved.
D. Security Threats to SDN
[17] proposes four security threats to SDN.
1) Centralized Control: Centralized control presents a po-
tential target to attackers, who may try to compromise the
SDN controller or to control the entire network by tricking.
2) Programmability: Because SDN offers clients a clearly
programmatic access, so service providers need to pay more
attention to system integrity, third-party data, and open inter-
faces.
3) Challenge of Integrating Legacy Protocols: SDN needs
to integrate legacy protocols, but it is difficult to retrofit
security ability into existing technologies such as domain
name server, border gateway protocol, and network address
translation. It is important to avoid repeating the weaknesses
of the existing technologies to in the SDN framework.
4) Cross Domain Connection: One means of SDN imple-
mentation is to connect with different domains infrastructures.
A trust model or authorization mechanism is needed to prevent
insecure connections.
[18] also identifies three attacks from the data plane in
SDN.
1) Flooding Attack: In the process of network transmission,
the sender needs to use the ARP protocol to obtain the
MAC address of the receiver so that packets can be correctly
forwarded to the receiver via L2 switches. The ARP protocol
asks for the MAC address based on the destination IP address,
and the sender puts the MAC address into its cache for
future use. An attacker can send a flood of fake ARP control
messages so that the sender caches incorrect information.
Thus, the packet will use the wrong MAC address and be
forwarded to the wrong host.
2) Host Tracking Service Attack: In a software defined
network, the central controller relies on a host tracking service
to confirm the host’s position in the topology. Applications
use this location to calculate routing paths. After a packet is
received, the switches report the host’s location to the central
controller. An attacker keeps sending packets with the IP
address of a victim as the source IP address. When the switch
connecting to the attacker receives the packets, it notifies the
central controller that the victim is connecting to the switch,
which is wrong location information and results in wrong path
calculation. Thus, all traffic for the victim will be forwarded
to the attacker by mistake.
3) Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) Attack: In a
software-defined network, the central controller uses the
topology discovery service to obtain the connections among
switches and knows the entire network topology. The topology
discovery service mainly requires the central controller to
broadcast LLDP packets to the switches, and the adjacent
switches send LLDP packets back to the central controller.
Thus, the central controller knows which switches are adjacent
and can calculate the entire topology. Because the LLDP
packets are broadcast to the network, an attacker can receive
the LLDP packets, then forge them and send them back to
the controller. The controller will mistakenly assume that the
attacker is the newly added shortest path and further update
the path. All packets destined for a victim will pass through
the attacker, and thus a man-in-the-middle attack is formed.
More SDN security threats are identified in [19] [20].
V. CONCLUSION
As we approach the 5G era, we need to prepare for new
cybersecurity issues. In this paper, we introduce the 5G E2E
architecture framework, NG-RAN, vEPC, SDN, NFV, and
NFV MANO. We then analyze four MANO implementations
and identify opportunities on the ONAP platform where secu-
rity solutions need to be developed. In this paper, we do not
concentrate on the known security threats, but report potential
threats to the architecture in the hope that the problems can
be solved in the development stage instead of remedying them
after attacks take place.
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